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THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM: ANALYSIS 
OF THE EFFICIENCY OF FINANCIAL ENTITIES 
 
ABSTRACT  
Purpose – This paper analyses the performance of Spanish banking entities between 
2009 and 2013, a period marked by the reform of the banking system with a large 
number of mergers and integrations. 
Design/methodology/approach – Firstly, efficiency is measured applying the Data 
Envelopment Analysis methodology and, then, the Malmquist index is calculated to 
assess its evolution. 
Findings – The results show that most of the entities have improved their performance 
from the production approach. However, from the intermediation approach, the 
efficiency of the sample has deteriorated, which raises questions about the sustainability 
of the traditional banking business when the current credit restriction strategy is long 
lasting. 
Practical implications – The comparative analysis demonstrates that, after the deep 
reforms carried out in Spain, the banking entities maintain similar efficiency rankings to 
those they had at the beginning of the period analysed. This shows that the reform has 
created new groups that operate adequately, avoiding the closing of institutions. Despite 
the better rationalisation of the available resources, the outlook for Spanish banks 
remains unclear in the current macroeconomic context, which does not favour the 
banking business.  
Originality/value – The study contributes to the literature on Spanish banking system 
because it adds new empirical evidence about its restructuring and it applies a DEA 
model to a sample before and after mergers. The authors discuss theoretical and 
managerial implications and offers suggestions for future research on this field. 
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1. Introduction 
The Spanish financial system underwent an uncontrolled growth during the first decade 
of the 21st century. During this period, financial entities (especially savings banks) 
expanded throughout the country, opening new branches even in zones outside their 
core area and the volume of bank loans rose to unsustainable figures. Most of this 
money was obtained from overseas wholesale markets to fund the real estate sector. 
With the global economic crisis, and the burst of the Spanish housing bubble, the 
savings banks became indebted and had a high percentage of credits on their balance 
sheet, which generated a greater risk of insolvency. The unnecessary excess of 
productive capacity, based on the growth of promoters and builders loans, with high 
default risks, was not well-assessed at the time. Excessive borrowing in wholesale 
markets, which caused a significant weakening of the core capital of savings banks, and 
the high default ratio in Spain, led to their balance sheets being flooded with property 
assets that lost their value daily.  
In this paper, we study this transformation process of the Spanish banking sector from 
the point of view of the efficiency of the entities. Our objectives are, first, to evaluate 
whether the reforms implemented have led to a better performance of the system and, 
second, to identify the entities that have shown a better behaviour in this process. To do 
so, we carry out a comparison of the efficiency of Spanish banking entities in 2009 and 
2013, applying the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist index to 
analyse efficiency changes. Unlike prior studies dealing with bank efficiency, we have 
measured the performance of financial entities using two different approaches to 
efficiency, the production and the intermediation approach. Thus, the results are 
expected to provide a more comprehensive view of the effects of the restructuring of the 
Spanish banking sector on the entities’ performance. The analysis sheds light on the 
effectiveness of the strategy adopted by the Spanish regulator that may be relevant to 
assist other countries whose banking systems are facing similar situations.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we develop the context of the 
study. The third section describes the effect of banking mergers on efficiency. The 
fourth section explains the research methodology and data used in the analysis. The fifth 
section presents the empirical results. The discussion is contained in the sixth section 
and, finally, the seventh section draws the conclusions.  
2. Context  
At the end of the decade, so many savings banks were threatened by insolvency that the 
financial sustainability of the whole system was at risk. In response to this situation, the 
banking sector embarked upon a recapitalization and restructuring process to regain 
trust in the system. Among the measures adopted, the following can be highlighted: 
- Creation of the Fund of Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) to channel public 
financial support to financial entities (Royal Decree-law 9/2009). 
- Reform of the legal regime of savings banks (Royal Decree-law 11/2010) to enhance 
their capitalization and the professionalization of their governing bodies. Later, the Law 
26/2013 on savings banks and banking foundations established that savings banks had 
to transfer their financial activity to a credit institution and enter into a banking 
foundation transformation agreement if they had a value of more than 10,000 million 
euros in total consolidated assets or a market share of more than 35% in deposits in their 
Autonomous communities1.  
- Increase of core capital requirements through Basel III, aimed at strengthening the 
solvency of financial entities by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage.  
                                                     
1 Autonomous communities is the official Spanish name for regions. 
As a result, the Spanish financial sector has undergone a conversion process of its 
commercial banking in which the number of institutions decreased from 54 in 2009 to 
17 in 2013 (See Appendix 1). In this process, Spanish savings banks have proven to be 
the weakest part of the national financial system (Parejo et al., 2011). The vast majority 
of the 45 savings banks that existed in 2009 have been nationalized or acquired by 
commercial banks (losing importance in the long term, as in other European countries): 
only 2 small savings banks and 4 groups remain. Autonomous communities have lost 
their influence over the savings banks, which the Spanish central government now 
controls. 
Another important factor, in addition to the restructuring of the banking system is the 
legal form of Spanish savings banks. They were private foundations and could not issue 
capital. However, entities resulting from the integration process can increase their 
equity by issuing capital in financial markets. This leads to the improvement of the core 
capital that, in a banking entity, is made up of nominal capital and reserves and defines 
its solvency level. A higher core capital indicates that an entity has a higher equity 
compared to risk-weighted assets. These assets include deposits from central banks (no 
risk) and industrial interests with a high risk. Savings banks investments in real estate 
were not risk controlled and supervised. With consolidation, it is expected that entities 
control their risk exposure by investing less aggressively in non-hedgeable risks. Banks 
should hedge any risk at fair-market values and hold capital for absorbing risks which 
cannot be hedged (Froot and Stein, 1998).   
3. Banking mergers and efficiency 
The scope and framework of this study can be explained by the changes that have taken 
place in the Spanish banking sector in recent years. In this section, we analyse the 
factors that contribute to explaining the effect of mergers on the efficiency of Spanish 
banking entities. 
According to traditional economic theory, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) create 
synergies and lowers costs through economies of scale (Williamson, 1968). M&A 
among banking entities are very frequent around the world and, currently, the banking 
sector is using them as a strategy for achieving larger size and being more competitive 
(Vander Vennet, 2002; Khan, 2011; Alhasan and Asare, 2016). Consolidation will be 
sustainable in the long run only if it increases efficiency or does not reduce efficiency 
substantially (Berger et al., 2001). However, more care should be taken in terms of the 
creation of excessive market power from M&A. According to Berger and Humphrey 
(1994), increased market concentration in the United States may lead to slightly less 
favourable prices of some deposit and loan accounts for consumers as well as a decrease 
in banking efficiency because bank managers enjoy some of the benefits of market 
power, such as reduced effort levels. These authors assert that this is not likely to occur 
in Europe, as these mergers tend to intensify market competition, resulting in more 
favourable prices for consumers and greater efficiency. In any case, country-specific 
factors, such as different banking regulations and the different managerial strategies 
implemented by banking entities to face the new challenges, are important determinants 
in explaining differences in bank efficiency levels (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). 
In the last five years, a wave of consolidation has transformed the Spanish banking 
industry. The financial crisis has intensified this process and acquisitions have been 
considered a means to prevent bank failures. The ability to correctly calculate the risk of 
each institution is crucial for good banking supervision and the stability of the financial 
system (García-Céspedes and Moreno, 2014). A bigger entity is considered more 
competitive and less risky than a smaller one. When an entity is less risky, it obtains 
funding in the interbank credit market with better economic conditions. Since the main 
activity of a bank is based on capturing customer money to lend to other customers, the 
entity that gets more and cheaper funding in the interbank market will be able to pay a 
lower interest rate, which will generate a higher margin. Net interest income is the most 
important item in the income statement of the entity (supplemented by utility 
commissions and other concepts) and has a direct relationship to efficiency. In line with 
this, Maudos et al. (2002b) find higher levels of inefficiency in revenues than in costs 
and analyse the importance of size to explain the inefficiencies in the revenue side of 
banking. It is important to take into account that the resulting entity will be less risky if 
it designs a restructuring strategy that includes the reduction of operating expenses such 
as salaries, central services expenses, number of branches, technology expenses and 
buildings. Currently, banks are decreasing staff costs and making labour force 
adjustments to obtain a higher operational efficiency, which generates stress and 
insecurity for employees of banking entities (Konstantopoulos et al., 2009). Other 
expenses that have been reduced are the rents of branches, custodial fees, security costs, 
communications costs, etc. 
The growth of Spanish banking entities was achieved by opening branches, which 
generated high overheads. In the crisis period, branches became non-profitable and have 
burdened the income statement, the opposite of what was intended. As consequence, it 
was necessary to close offices and to reduce personnel and other costs. If the entity is 
large, for instance, merged entities, increasing the number of offices does not lead to 
improved profitability unless it expands into new geographical areas. In a recession, 
improved performance is usually achieved by reducing the number of offices. If the 
entity is oversized, it should reduce its costs, trying to maintain the business achieved in 
the expansionary phase. If banking entities are able to keep their number of clients 
despite closing branches, gains emerge from savings in staff and rental costs. However, 
cost reduction does not necessarily imply an improvement in efficiency (Tortosa-
Ausina, 2002; Carbo et al., 2003) as the evolution of income also influences this 
magnitude.  
Although the integration process is taking place to obtain long-term synergies and 
increases performance (Bernad et al., 2013), results about the benefits derived from 
mergers are not consistent (Gutiérrez Fernández et al., 2013).  
4. Methodology and data 
We have used the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to analyse the factors that 
determine the performance of banking entities. Our database is made up of observations 
of 17 entities in 2009 and 20132. The DEA technique is a non-parametric method based 
on linear programming that was developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker et al. 
(1989). It is used to measure the relative efficiency of various decision-making units 
(DMU), which are organizations where several inputs and outputs are taken into 
account. It compares the inputs and the outputs of DMUs by establishing a frontier of 
efficiency and by evaluating efficiency relative to that frontier. Therefore, a DMU is 
qualified as efficient if no other DMU can produce more outputs by using an equal or 
smaller quantity of inputs, or if no other DMU can use fewer inputs to produce an 
equivalent or higher quantity of outputs. DEA coefficients give an idea of the theoretical 
maximum quantity of inputs that could be reduced without affecting the output level 
(for instance, a coefficient X means that it would be possible to obtain the same output 
with a saving of (100 – X) % of inputs). When the coefficient is 1.00 the DMU is 
comparatively efficient, i.e. the DMU optimizes its resources to obtain the output.  
                                                     
2 For 2009, the study considers the sum of the amounts of the input/output variables of the entities that 
form the banking groups of 2013. 
There are two main alternatives for measuring banking activity, namely, the production 
approach and the intermediation approach. The first considers banking institutions as 
producers of services for their customers. The intermediation approach expands the 
definition of inputs to include deposits and suggests measures of banking output 
according to the time value of money, basically in earning assets. It considers banking 
institutions primarily as intermediating entities between savers and investors. Prior 
studies have measured performance by focusing on one of these two alternatives, 
particularly the intermediation approach (Illueca et al., 2009), but there is, as far as we 
know, no research that considers both approaches. In this study, we adopt this dual 
perspective.  
For the production approach, the number of branches and the staff have been included 
as inputs in the model. As outputs, we include the amount of deposits, loans and 
negotiable securities. Authors such as Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Grifell-Tatje and 
Lovell (1996), Fried et al. (2003), Prior (2003), Kumbhakar et al. (2011) and Camanho 
and Dyson (2005) have followed the production approach or have included these 
variables in their studies. For the intermediation approach, the inputs are the amount of 
deposits and interest and charges paid. As outputs, we include loans, interest and fees 
received and the inverse of impairments. The intermediation approach with these inputs 
and outputs has been used by Maudos et al. (2002a), Carbo et al. (2003), Cuesta and 
Zofío (2005), Illueca et al. (2009), Williams et al. (2011) and Pina et al., (2016), among 
others. 
After running the DEA model, we have calculated the Malmquist index for the period 
2009 to 2013. The Malmquist index makes use of distance functions to measure 
productivity change over time, and can be multiplicatively decomposed into an 
efficiency change index and a technological change index. 
Caves et al. (1982) proposed that the Malmquist index between time periods t and 
(t + 1) can be defined as: 
 
where D represents the distance function and the value of M is the Malmquist index. 
The first ratio measures the productivity change from period t to period (t + 1) using 
period t technology as a benchmark. The second ratio measures the productivity change 
from period t to period (t + 1) using period (t + 1) technology as a benchmark. From an 
input-orientated perspective, a value of M less than one denotes productivity growth, a 
value greater than one indicates productivity decline, and M equal to 1 corresponds to 
stagnation. 
5. Results of the study 
In this section, the results obtained using the DEA and Malmquist methodology are 
presented. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
analyses. As can be seen, all the indicators, except for the negotiable securities, 
experienced a significant decline in terms of their mean during 2009-13, evidencing the 
banking activity downturn in this period. The growth in the volume of negotiable 
securities is mainly due to the intensive purchase of public debt. Spanish Government 
bonds held by Spanish banks increased from 165,000 million euros in 2011 to 300,000 
million euros in 2013 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013). The other positive figure is the 
42% reduction over the period of the impairments of financial assets. The statistical 
magnitudes (std dev, max and min) reflect the great heterogeneity of the Spanish 
banking system, particularly the differences between the biggest and smallest entities.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents the results of the production approach. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
As can be seen, the results of the constant returns to scale (CRS) model in 2009 show 
that Banco Santander, Bankia and Bankinter constitute the efficient frontier. So, neither 
the size nor the nature of banking entities are per se factors that explain differences in 
efficiency because the efficient DMUs are a big bank (Banco Santander), a savings bank 
(Bankia) and a small bank (Bankinter). However, the three least efficient DMUs –below 
60%– are the smallest entities in the sample. All the other entities obtain efficiency 
scores between 70% and 86%. The analysis of efficiency with the variable returns to 
scale (VRS) model shows similar results to the CRS model and, as a consequence, the 
scale efficiency (CRS/VRS) is close to 100% for most entities, which indicates that they 
are operating on an appropriate scale and that size is not the cause of their inefficiencies, 
with the exceptions of Caja Pollença and Caja Ontinyent. Both these entities, the two 
remaining saving banks in the sample, show a low efficiency scale, which suggests that 
the size of these entities is smaller than the optimum. 
Bankinter and Bankia are the only entities that obtain the maximum efficiency score in 
2013. Although, by this year, all the banks had reduced both the number of branches 
and the number of employees, Bankinter has significantly increased the amount of its 
deposits and loans while the efficiency of Bankia is based on the variable negotiable 
securities, the amount of which increased by 64% during 2009-13, proportionately 
higher than the rest. It should be highlighted that the increase of the resources of Bankia 
after the merger was mainly due to the public financial assistance it received. Bankia 
was recapitalised in 2012 with more than €20bn of public money from the FROB. In the 
other entities, the decrease of branches and staff was accompanied by lower deposits 
and loans, except for Banco Popular, Banca March and Banco Sabadell whose deposits 
increase. As a consequence, there is a wider gap in 2013 than in 2009 between the 
efficiency of Bankinter and Bankia and the rest, which have scores of lower than 85%. 
In contrast to 2009, the VRS model for 2013 shows significant differences in Banco 
Santander, BBVA, La Caixa, Bankia and Caja Pollença, which obtain a score of 100%, 
while others obtain similar scores to the CRS model. As a consequence, the evaluation 
of the scale efficiency allows us to identify a group of entities made up of Banco 
Santander, BBVA, La Caixa, Popular, Sabadell, Caja Pollença and Caja Ontinyent 
whose inefficiency can be explained by their size. For the other entities, inefficiency is 
due to other causes. Scale inefficiencies arise for 5 of the 6 biggest Spanish financial 
entities and for the 2 smallest. 
Finally, the Malmquist index, which shows the evolution of the efficiency, reveals that 
all entities have improved their productive efficiency in the period analysed, especially 
Banca March, Caja3 and Caja Pollença. During this period, financial entities drastically 
reduced the number of branches and staff to save costs and compensate for the 
prolonged contraction of their commercial activity.  
Table 3 presents the results of the intermediation approach. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The analysis of efficiency with the CRS model shows that Banco Santander, Bankia, 
Banco Sabadell, Bankinter and Caja Pollença are the most efficient entities in 2009. 
Once again, the results indicate that the size and the nature of entities are not factors that 
explain inefficiency. In this model, the maximum score obtained by one of the smallest 
entities, Caja Pollença, indicates that a company can be small and efficient when it 
manages its resources adequately. Unicaja and Caja3 obtain the lowest scores (around 
65%), which indicates that these entities are not able to profitably transform deposits 
into loans. The VRS model confirms the results from the CRS model, except that 
BBVA now obtains a score of 100%. Similar to the production approach, the scale 
efficiency is close to 100% for most of the entities. So, the size of each entity is 
appropriate to acting as intermediaries in this sector.  
Banco Popular, Banco Sabadell, Caja Pollença and Caja Ontinyent are the efficient 
DMUs in 2013. Among the less efficient entities, Banco Santander, BBVA, La Caixa 
and Bankia obtain a score of around 60%, which is 30% less than the efficiency they 
obtained in 2009. These results show that the bigger Spanish banks have not run their 
businesses efficiently or fulfilled their function as intermediaries. The scale efficiency is 
especially low for Banco Santander, BBVA and La Caixa. This indicates that these 
entities do not operate with an optimum scale and their size may be encumbering their 
efficiency.  
The Malmquist index for the intermediation approach presents higher scores than for 
the production approach. This indicates that the efficiency of the sample in the period 
2009-2013 has deteriorated considerably and that the traditional banking business 
(granting credit and capturing deposits) has been run inefficiently. 
6. Discussion  
This paper studies the effect of bank consolidation on the efficiency of Spanish banking 
entities. To analyse how the process of mergers in Spain has influenced efficiency, we 
have run two DEA models (production and intermediation approaches) for 2009 and 
2013 and calculated the Malmquist index for both approaches. Our findings indicate 
that the efficiency of banks from the production approach improved in the period 2009-
2013, the period in which the mergers took place, but it did not improve from the 
intermediation approach. These results show that the performance of the financial 
entities is a multifaceted concept and, as a consequence, its measurement must be 
addressed from different approaches. Although there is a vast literature analysing the 
efficiency of financial institutions, most studies focus on just one of these dimensions, 
giving only a partial view of their performance. The experience of the Spanish banking 
system reveals that production and intermediation are different and independent aspects 
of the activity of financial entities. The analysis of the restructuring of the Spanish 
banking system that began after its collapse in 2009 leads to different conclusions 
depending on the perspective adopted.  
From the point of view of the services production activity of entities (production 
efficiency), the reforms undertaken have contributed to improving the efficiency of the 
system, encouraging a more rational allocation of inputs and outputs. The extraordinary 
expansion of most of the financial entities in the years prior to the crisis led to an excess 
of capacity in the Spanish banking industry (Carbó and Rodríguez, 2016). Thus, the 
restructuring of the Spanish financial system was necessary to rebalance the supply and 
demand of financial entities. As we know, mergers and acquisitions in the Spanish 
banking industry during the 90s, when the number of banks and saving banks fell from 
around 80 to 51, did not lead to significant improvements in their efficiency (Fuentes 
and Sastre, 1999). This is coherent with the hypothesis of Palomo and Sanchis (2010) 
who argue that mergers are more successful when they are underpinned by reasons of 
economic rationality and not when they respond to the growth and expansion of the 
financial entities, as was the case in the 90s. The consolidation process initiated in 2009 
has increased the concentration of the banking industry, enabling financial entities to 
reduce the number of employees and branches by concentrating part of their operational 
activity in central departments. At the same time, the public aid of around 60,000 
million euros that was injected into the banks and the purchase of part of their toxic 
assets and non-performing loans by the Spanish “bad bank” (SAREB), created in 2012, 
have contributed to cleaning up the banks’ balance sheets and to underpinning the 
banking business. Furthermore, the reforms in the Spanish banking system seem to have 
been well-planned because, with few exceptions, the entities maintain similar rankings. 
From the point of view of the intermediation activity (intermediation efficiency), the 
results show a decline in the productivity of all financial entities during the period 
analysed. This means that the efficiency of the sample has fallen and that the traditional 
banking business (granting credit and capturing deposits) has been run inefficiently. So, 
the measures implemented in the Spanish banking system have proven to be ineffective 
or, at least, not sufficient to revitalise the financial system and to make the entities 
profitable again. As a consequence, uncertainty persists about the survival of some 
banks and it seems clear that new reforms will be needed. There are some factors which 
may help explain the increasing pressure on the banking industry and the consequent 
delay of a return to profits for many financial institutions at European level and, 
particularly, in Spain. First, the current prolonged period of low interest rates has a 
negative impact on the profitability of banks because it diminishes their margins and 
banks have to take higher risks to increase profits (Bachiller et al., 2016). The negative 
impact of this current low interest rate environment is more severe in banking systems 
that, like the Spanish, have a high degree of reliance on the traditional banking model. 
For the smallest banks in Spain, it is even more difficult to compensate for these lower 
margins with other activities (Ocaña and Faibiscenko, 2016). Nevertheless, the results 
of this study do not corroborate this perspective because four of the biggest banks show 
the worst performance evolution. Second, the stricter financial regulation imposed by 
the central banks with the aim of increasing the transparency and solvency of banks may 
be having a negative impact on their capacity to augment credit flows and productive 
investments. Moreover, as the European economy is still weak, banks are more cautious 
when analysing risks. This indicates that the improvement in solvency has been to the 
detriment of profitability. Finally, the drastic deterioration of the Spanish economy 
during the period analysed, with an unemployment rate rising from 13.8% in 2008 to 
25.7% in 2013, brought about an ongoing fall in domestic demand. As a consequence, 
the rate of non-performing loans grew from 4.97% in 2009 to 13.77% in 2013 and bank 
lending fell into a vicious circle of less funding, less demand and greater arrears.  
The analysis shows that neither the size nor the nature of the banking entities are per se 
factors that explain differences in efficiency because the efficient DMUs include a big 
bank (Banco Santander), a savings bank (Bankia) and a small bank (Bankinter). So, a 
company can be small and efficient if it manages its resources adequately, that is, if it is 
able to profitably transform deposits into loans.  
 
7. Conclusions  
The efficiency of banking entities has multiple dimensions and not all of them are 
necessarily correlated. Therefore, studies that analyse efficiency must limit the scope of 
their conclusions to the dimensions addressed.  
The comparative analysis undertaken demonstrates that, despite the deep reforms 
carried out in Spain, the efficiency of the banking sector maintains a similar ranking to 
that which it had at the beginning of the period analysed only from the point of view of 
the production approach. This shows that the reforms have acted proportionately 
through the banking system, avoiding the closing of institutions. Furthermore, entities 
that do not operate on an optimum scale can be profitable, for instance, when they offer 
specialized treatment for specific niche markets. So, the future performance of Spanish 
banking groups will depend on their capacity to promote a profitable business and select 
the best investment opportunities.  
The consolidation of the Spanish banking sector has contributed to improving the 
productive efficiency of entities by rationalising the available resources. Mergers have 
been carried out to save costs and not to increase market share or eliminate competitors’ 
power. However, at the same time, the strong contraction in the main activity of the 
financial institutions, granting credits, has led to a decrease in efficiency from the point 
of view of intermediation. The current macroeconomic context, in particular the low 
interest rates and high default rates, has affected the profitability of the banking 
business. This will have to be corrected to maintain the sustainability of some entities 
and, in the case of Bankia, to pay back the financial aids given by Europe. Meanwhile, 
new mergers of banks cannot be ruled out. 
This study identifies some interesting implications for policymakers; because, when 
considering the process of banking mergers to strengthen this sector, economic issues 
other than growth and expansion criteria should be taken into account. Some questions 
that arise for future research are the influence of the regulation on the performance of 
banking entities and the analysis of the banking sector after transnational mergers. The 
consolidation of this sector is still at an intermediate stage. 
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Mean max min std dev Mean max min std dev 2009-13 
Branches  2,220 8,597 21 2,302 1,413 5,647 20 1,576 -36% 
Staff 12,909 39,557 87 12,617 9,059 30,437 80 9,96 -30% 
Deposits 
(thousands €) 77,758,455 240,156,183 289,16 79,050,045 67,565,156 207,374,182 380,8 69,375,894 -18% 
Loans 
(thousands €) 93,849,407 303,241,679 274,87 99,680,666 64,636,930 215,120,571 291,91 73,379,320 -31% 
Securities 
(thousands €) 29,254,240 125,585,781 42,062 39,540,268 34,273,227 137,470,951 55,131 44,191,448 17% 
Interest paid 









1,850,705 11,582,068 1,704 2,907,325 1,064,718 4,196,919 2,125 12,683,303 -42% 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Spanish banking association annual reports 
 
Table 2: Coefficients of technical efficiency and Malmquist Index (Production approach) 
 
 2009 2013 Malmquist Index 


















Banco Mare Nostrum 
Nova Caixa Galicia 
Caja de Ahorros de Pollença 
 
Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de Ontinyent 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 85,31% 100,00% 85,31% 1,172 0,821 0,963 
86,47% 100,00% 86,47% 69,71% 100,00% 69,71% 1,240 0,708 0,878 
73,20% 73,20% 100,00% 58,90% 100,00% 58,90% 1,243 0,706 0,878 
100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 1,000 0,862 0,862 
70,85% 70,95% 99,86% 60,69% 87,71% 69,19% 1,167 0,689 0,804 
76,38% 84,07% 90,85% 53,17% 79,07% 67,24% 1,437 0,683 0,980 
54,98% 58,32% 94,27% 61,20% 64,18% 95,36% 0,898 0,682 0,613 
100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 1,000 0,967 0,967 
72,12% 72,52% 99,45% 58,41% 58,68% 99,54% 1,235 0,664 0,820 
82,83% 83,63% 99,04% 69,46% 69,51% 99,93% 1,192 0,678 0,809 
77,20% 78,05% 98,91% 69,87% 70,56% 99,02% 1,105 0,696 0,769 
73,74% 75,27% 97,97% 77,67% 79,62% 97,55% 0,949 0,718 0,682 
80,40% 80,96% 99,31% 56,25% 56,31% 99,89% 1,429 0,664 0,949 
78,36% 78,78% 99,47% 65,37% 65,56% 99,71% 1,199 0,680 0,815 
80,08% 80,55% 99,42% 73,69% 74,25% 99,25% 1,087 0,711 0,772 
44,14% 100,00% 44,14% 39,97% 100,00% 39,97% 1,104 0,664 0,733 
46,98% 68,37% 68,71% 36,75% 63,21% 58,14% 1,278 0,696 0,890 
 
Appendix 1 





Caixa d´Estalvis de Catalunya 
BBVA 
Caixa d'Estalvis Comarcal de Manlleu 
Caixa d´Estalvis de Tarragona 
Caixa d´Estalvis de Terrassa 
Caixa d´Estalvis de Manresa 
Caixa d´Estalvis de Sabadell 
BBVA 
Caixa d´Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona.   
LA CAIXA 
Caja de Ahorros Municipal de Burgos 
Caixa d´Estalvis de Girona 
Caja de Ahorro Provincial de Guadalajara 
Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Navarra 
Caja General de Ahorros de Canarias 
Caja de Ahorros Provincial San Fernando de Sevilla y Jerez 
Banco de Valencia 
Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de Ávila 
BANKIA 
Caja de Ahorros de la Rioja 
Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de Madrid 
 Caixa d´Estalvis Laietana 
Caja Insular de Ahorros de Canarias 
Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de Segovia 
 Bancaja 
Banco Popular  
BANCO POPULAR Banco Pastor 
Caja Mediterráneo 
SABADELL Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de Gipuzkoa y San Sebastían 
Banco Sabadell 
Banca March BANCA MARCH 
Bankinter BANKINTER 
Caja Provincial de Ahorros de Jaén 
UNICAJA 
Caja España de Inversiones, Caja de Ahorros y M. P. 
UNICAJA 
Caja de Ahorros de Salamanca y Soria - Caja Duero 
Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa 
KUTXA Cajasur 
Caja de Ahorros de Vitoria y Álava 
Ibercaja IBERCAJA 
Caja de Ahorros de la Inmaculada de Aragón 
Monte de Piedad y Caja General de A. de Badajoz 
Caja de A. y M. P. del Círculo Católico de Obreros de 
Burgos 
CAJA 3 
Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de Extremadura 
Caja de Ahorros de Castilla la Mancha 
Caja de Ahorros de Asturias 
Caja de Ahorros de Santander y Cantabria 
LIBERBANK 
Caja General de Ahorros de Granada 
MARE NOSTRUM (BMN) 
Caja de Ahorros de Murcia 
Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de las Baleares 
Caixa d´Estalvis del Penedés 
Caja de Ahorros de Galicia 
NOVA CAIXA GALICIA 
Caixa de Aforros de Vigo, Ourense y Pontevedra 
Caja de Ahorros de Pollença Caja de Ahorros de 
POLLENÇA 
Caja Ontinyent Caja ONTINYENT 
 
